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Benjamin Dugan entered a conditional
under Idaho Code § 1

18.

. Dugan

Memorandum Decision denying
that the district court

of guilty to the charge of injuring jails
his right to challenge the district
Dugan's Motion to Dismiss.

Mr. Dugan

in denying his motion to dismiss the injuring jails

as his alleged conduct did not constitute damage to a jailor "place of
confinement" and, thus, his conduct did not amount to injuring jails.

On December 5, 2011, Mr. Dugan was leaving the courtroom after a hearing on a
grand theft by possession of stolen property charge.
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.g.)

(1/5/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-8;
Mr. Dugan was angry

regarding the recent proceedings in court and as he was leaving court, he stepped into
the jury room and tipped over chairs. (1/5/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-22, p.22, L.19 - p.23, L.2.)
He also banged his head into the hallway walls as he exited the courthouse. (1/5/12
Tr., p.1i, Ls.i9-22, p.23, Ls.3-9.)

Mr. Dugan was to be transported from the Blaine

county Courthouse back to the Blaine County Detention Center in one of the Blaine
County patrol vehicles, a 2006 Dodge Durango. 1

(1/5/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-2D.)

After

being placed in the patrol vehicle, Mr. Dugan began kicking and head butting the doors
and the rear surfaces of the rear compartment area of the vehicle. (1/5/12 Tr., p.12,
L.i8 - 13, L.9; R., p.i D.) Mr. Dugan was in belly chains and shackle restraints at the

1 The Dodge Durango had previously been used as a patrol vehicle but, at the time of
this incident, was being used only for transporting persons to and from the Blaine
County Jail. (1/5/12 Tr., p.23, Ls.15-22; 4/3/12 Tr., p.?, Ls.2-8.)

1

time,

still

to inflict damage to

of

charged Mr. Dugan with

was

to his

during

(1/5/12 Tr., p

After the deputy's testimony, counsel for Mr.
dismissed

the deputy
p.25, L.10.)

should

I.C. § 18-7018 does not apply to Mr. Dugan's

patrol vehicle is not a "place of confinement."

(5/1/12 Tr.,

concern that it was not familiar with the
statute, but nonetheless found that the
Tr.,

§ 1

in violation of I

injuring

preliminary

vehicle. Cl/5/1

p.23,

15.)

a
Ls.9-11.)

The

history of the

had met its burden of proof.

(1/5/12

The magistrate judge found probable cause to bind

Mr. Dugan over into the district court. (1/5/12 Tr. p.32,

16-19.) The State then filed

an Information again alleging that Mr. Dugan had committed the crime of injuring jails
by, "willfully and intentionally break[ing] down and or destroy[ing] and/or injur[ing] a
place of confinement, to-wit: the interior of Blaine County Sheriff jail transport vehicle
SD713, a 2006 Dodge Durango." (R, pp.22-23.)
Counsel for Mr. Dugan filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R, pp.33-42.) During the hearing on the Motion to
Dismiss, counsel for Mr. Dugan argued, inter alia, that the language of I.C. § 18-7018
was plain and unambiguous and that the term "place of confinement" could not be
interpreted to include an implement of transportation, even a patrol vehicle that was

As the costs to repair the damaged vehicle was estimated to be $1,174.31, the
conduct could have been charged as a violation of I.C. § 18-7001, felony malicious
injury to property, which also has a maximum penalty of five years in the custody of the
Idaho Department of Correction. (R, p.10.)
2

2

to transport prisoners to and from

County jail;

alternatively, under the rule of lenity, the court should construe the

that,

narrowly and

find that the allegations in Mr. Dugan's case did not constitute injuring jails as described

(4/31'12, p.

by

After hearing

L.2

p.9, L.1

R., pp.33-36.)

arguments of counsel, the district

(4/3/12 Tr., p.18, Ls.1

the

under

Later, the

written

decision denying Mr. Dugan's motion to dismiss, finding

the evidence was sufficient

to show

Mr. Dugan injured or damaged a "place of confinement" when

interior doors of

patrol vehicle. (R., pp.

1.) In

damaged

analysis, the

court

first examined the plain, ordinary meaning of the term "place of confinement":
Black's
Dictionary defines confinement as, "[t]he act of imprisoning or
restraining someone; the state of being imprisoned or restrained." (9 th
2009). Webster's Dictionary contains twelve definitions for "place." The
most relevant definitions include, "physical environment, a way for
admission or transit, physical surroundings; an indefinite region or
expanse, a building or locality used for a special purpose, the threedimensional compass of a material object; a particular region, center of
population, or location, a building, part of a building, or area occupied as a
home; an available seat or accommodation, an empty or vacated
position." MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2012).

(R., p.56.)

The district court did not analyze the import of the above definitions in

determining the plain, ordinary meaning of the term, but instead turned to a decision by
the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah v. Burgess-Beynon, 99 P.3d 383 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004),
remarking:
The sole issue on appeal in Burgess-Beynon, was whether "other place of
confinement" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 included police vehicles.
The Utah statute is nearly identical to the Idaho statute, stating, "[a]
person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys,
floods, or otherwise damages any public jailor other place of confinement,
including a detention, shelter, or secure confinement facility for juveniles,
is guilty of a felony of the third degree." As in Idaho, the Utah court
remarked that they had previously not interpreted the "other place of

3

confinement" portion of their
Utah court determined that
was nothing in the statute limiting "other place of confinement" to
something like a jail, prison or other penal facility, as the defendant had
argued. This Court finds the same lack of limiting language in this Idaho

This Court must find
had the
confinement"
mean "correctional
"correctional facility"
lieu of "other
7018.

intended
" it would
just
of confinement," in I

of

The defendant
argues that the
argument is dependent on the
physical presence of the defendant. This argument presumes that if the
defendant were in a hospital, the
would then argue the hospital is a
place of confinement and, therefore, any damage committed by the
defendant would be Injury to a Jail. This Court disagrees with this line of
logic for two reasons. First, in Baxter v.
149 Idaho 859, 863,
3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010), the Court
"[w]e do not read I.C. § 18~
7018 as limiting the statute to include harm to only the physical structure.
Instead, Idaho's statute is all inclusive and incorporates injury to any jailor
other place of confinement including its operational and maintenance
equipment."
Id. at 864.
Clearly a hospital is not operational or
maintenance equipment of a jail. Second, when in a hospital or other
place not intended to designed for confinement, a defendant is shackled
and guarded, precisely because the facility is not a place of confinement.
However, a vehicle used by the Sheriff's Office to transport defendants to
and from the jail to court or other correctional facilities is clearly designed
and intended for confinement and is also operational or maintenance
equipment of the jail.
(R., pp.56-58.)
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that I.C. § 18-7018 was
not ambiguous, and that the term "other place of confinement" meant a physical
environment or surrounding that is intended to imprison or restrain someone.
(R., pp.53-61.) Mr. Dugan entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of injury to
jails, preserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss

4

(R., pp.74, 87.) The district

on

Mr.

ordered a substance abuse evaluation and a

Alforcf' plea and

(Tr. 4/19/12, p.

L.25

p.55, L.8.)

The district court imposed a withheld judgment, and placed Mr. Dugan on probation for

a

of five
timely

, pp.73-81, 62-69; Tr. 6/14/12, p.1
of Appeal.

Ls.11~16.)

Mr. Dugan

(R., pp.84-86.)

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ("An individual accused of crime may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime.")
3

5

err by denying
Motion to Dismiss
a
of confinement"?

6

a patrol

A.

district court

Mr.
information

the

'Jv"J~~

in denying

upon the failure of the

for every element of the

to

motion to dismiss
probable cause

offense. Specifically, the State failed to establish that

Mr. Dugan damaged a "place of confinement" within the meaning of I.C. § 18-7018.
Mr. Dugan was charged with injury to jails
he was being transported back

he damaged

the Blaine County jail. Although

cause to believe that Mr. Dugan was the individual who inflicted

patrol vehicle while
was
damage, there is no

evidence that he committed the crime of injuring jails, as defined in I.C. § 18-7018,
because a patrol vehicle is not a "place of confinement" within the meaning of the
statute.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a finding of probable cause, this Court defers to the findings of

fact of the lower court that are supported by substantial evidence, but this Court reviews

de novo whether those facts as found constitute probable cause.

State v. Martinez-

Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775,778 (Ct. App. 2012).
In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de

novo. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, this Court is
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a
construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid
treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v.

7

Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152
1

at 1

State v.

Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

a

was insufficient
of injuring jails under I.C. § '18-701
required to
LC.R.

1(b).

evidence "upon

of probable cause for the

At a preliminary hearing,

state is

material element of the offense charged."

State presents its theory of the charge, both through argument and

by the complaint filed, and then the

examines the charge from the state,

along with the evidence presented, to determine whether "a public

has been

committed and [if] there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant
committed such offense." I.C.R. 5.1 (b); State v. McLellan, 154 Idaho 77,
303, 305 (Ct. App. 2013).

294 P.3d

Further, although the magistrate is entitled to rely on the

theory and argument set forth by the State, there is no requirement that the magistrate
search the record and the law to find alternate theories of the case for the State to
proceed under. McLellan, at _ , 294 P.3d at 305. "The duty to proffer theories of a
case under which the state wishes to proceed rests solely with the state, as it
possesses the power to bring and subsequently seek to amend and prosecute
charges." Id.
The State alleged that Mr. Dugan committed injury to a jail, where Mr. Dugan
kicked and head butted the door panels of a Blaine County patrol vehicle. In this case,
the State-in both its initial criminal complaint and its Information-charged Mr. Dugan
with felony injuring jails pursuant to I.C. § 18-7018. (R., pp.6-7, 22-23.) The relevant
portion of this statutory provision provides that:

8

Every person
or otherwise
confinement,
imprisonment

who wilfully [sic] and intentionally
down, pulls down
destroys or injures any public jailor other place of
is punishable by fine not exceeding $10,000, and by
in the state prison not exceeding five years.

§ 18-70'18.

Idaho

damage to a patrol vehicle

injury to

under I.C. § '18-7018

previously

published opinion in Idaho and, therefore,

to

Construction and application of
courts exercise

of

considered

any

first impression. 4

an

purely legal questions, and therefore

review. McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 1

(2000); Ivlitchell v. Bingham, 130 Idaho

be

jailor other

(1

Idaho

"The language of

statute has to

plain, obvious, and rational meaning." State v. Bumight, 1

Idaho 654,

659 (1999). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] court
must

give

effect

to

the

statute

as

written,

without

engaging

in

statutory

construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 (Ct. App. 2001).
Mr. Dugan does not contest that he damaged the door panels of the patrol
vehicle. What Mr. Dugan does challenge is the district court's conclusion that the patrol
vehicle was a "place of confinement" such that probable cause existed to find that
Mr. Dugan violated I.C. § 18-7018.

1.

The Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-7018 Is Not Ambiguous

The State failed to show that Mr. Dugan damaged a "place of confinement" when
he kicked and head butted the door panels of the patrol vehicle.

Although Idaho

As the district court noted in its Memorandum, State v. Magill, 119 Idaho 218 (Ct. App.
1991), was a case in which the district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
the charge of injuring jails where it was alleged that the defendant caused damage to a
police car; however, this issue was never taken up by the Court of Appeals, as the State
as dismissed that charge as part of a plea agreement. (R., p.56.)
4

9

§

18~7018

does

define "place of confinement," the language of

must

plain, obvious, and rational meaning. The plain, obvious, rational meaning
of

of confinement" is a location that houses prisoners,
facility. This meaning is
"

I.C § 1

12

a jailor

with the other Idaho
the

or a "confinement

providing that committed

confinement"), .C. § 20-242 (statute detailing

must be

of

requirements of a furlough, including

penalties for failing to return to the "place of confinement"); I

§

(statute

providing that court may order person confined in county or municipal jailor other
"confinement facility").
This meaning is consistent with the definitions used in other jurisdictions.

e.g., United

v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2010) (Missouri Revised

Statutes 556.061 (21) defining "place of confinement" as "any building or facility and the
grounds thereof wherein a court is legally authorized to order that a person charged with
or convicted of a crime be held."); Stephens v. Cent. Office Review Comm. of New York

State Oep't of Carr. SeNs., 255 A.D.2d 845, 846, 683 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (1998) (N.Y.
Correct. Law § 158 (McKinney) providing that "[t]he commissioner may designate as a
place of confinement of a prisoner any available, suitable and appropriate correctional

5

The definition of "correctional facility," contained in I.C. § 18-101A, is instructive:
(1) "Correctional facility" means a facility for the confinement of prisoners
or juvenile offenders. The term shall be construed to include
references to terms including, but not limited to, "prison," "state prison,"
"state penitentiary," "governmental detention facility," "penal institution
(facility)," "correctional institution," "juvenile correctional center," "Idaho
security medical program," "detention institution (facility)," "juvenile
detention center (facility)," "county jail," "jail," "private prison (facility),"
"private correctional facility," or those facilities that detain juvenile
offenders pursuant to a contract with the Idaho department of juvenile
corrections.
10

institution or facility whether maintained by the city,
may

or federal government and

time transfer a prisoner from one place of confinement to another.").
Here, the district court examined the plain, ordinary meaning

the

"confinement":
Black's
defines
"[t]he
of imprisoning or
restraining sorneone; the
of being imprisoned or restrained." (9 th
2009). Webster's Dictionary contains twelve definitions for "place."
most relevant definitions include, "physical environment, a way for
admission or transit, physical surroundings; an indefinite region or
expanse, a building or locality used for a special purpose, the
dimensional compass of a rnaterial object; a particular region, center
population, or location, a building, part of building, or area occupied as
home; an available seat or accommodation, an empty or
position." MERRIAM-WEBSTER (201
,p.56.) Based on the above meanings of "place," the most prevalent meaning of the
term is a building; however, the district court did not analyze the import

the above

definitions on deterrnining the plain, ordinary rneaning of the language, but instead
relied on a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah v. Burgess-Beynon, 99

3d

383 (Ut. App. 2004).
The Burgess-Beynon decision is not controlling authority and the Utah court's
decision in Burgess-Beynon is limited to that court's interpretation of the intent of its
legislature.
A reviewing Court merely interprets a statute, beginning with its plain language,

and it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to determine whether a statute is socially
unwise or should be amended. Verska v. St. Alphosus Regional Medical Center, 151
Idaho 8S9, S93 (2011) (quoting In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 556, 567 (2006)). For
example, where the legislature itself provides a statement of purpose that is not
specifically enacted into law, the statement of purpose has no legal effect. Id. at S92893.

'''The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain
11

", Id. (quoting Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187,
(2010)).

191

more

By

extension, the judiciary is not
contained

than
legislature
is

, no matter how broadly the Court

the statute to

151 Idaho

no basis for this Court

meaning

conclude

of confinement" to

or prisoners are
legislature meant the

interpret a

lodged,

the legislature
those

upon

belief or assumption that the

to be interpreted broadly. There is simply no support in

Idaho law for the district court's conclusion that

"place of confinement" can be a

method of transportation, such that a patrol car would constitute a "place of
confinement. "
In concluding that the State met its burden of proof, the district court erroneously
relied on the Idaho Court of Appeals' language from Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859
(Ct. App. 2010). In its Memorandum, the district court relied on Baxter.

First, in Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 863, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App.
2010), the Court stated, "[w]e do not read I.C. § 18-7018 as limiting the
statute to include harm to only the physical structure. Instead, Idaho's
statute is a/l inclusive and incorporates injury to any jail or other place of
confinement including its operational and maintenance equipment." Id. at
864. Clearly a hospital is not operational or maintenance equipment of a
jail.
(R., p.58.) Here, the district court erroneously extended the holding in Baxter to include

a patrol vehicle within the meaning of operational or maintenance equipment of a jail.
(R., pp.53-61.) However, in Baxter, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that a telephone

was part of the operational equipment of the jail, even though it was not owned by the
jail.

Baxter, 149 Idaho at 864.

The Court listed communication devices and video

surveillance equipment as examples of equipment items present in modern jail facilities.
12

lel Further,

Court noted that

the telephone was

to

wall of

jail, it was therefore connected to the actual physical structure of the jail through wiring
such that it could

classified as a jail fixture. Id.

is a fixture,

wall

a

the operational or

is not.
a jail.

n.1. A telephone attached to
equipment of a jail

vehicle is not equipment

It is an item

or

to transport persons housed inside

courthouse, but it is not part of the physical structure

jail to the

a jail, nor is it contained within

the walls of the jail, nor is it even a fixture of the jail.
in this case is whether probable cause
committed injury to jails under I.

§ "18-7018, due to

Because the finding of probable cause must be

oa~,ea

find
damage done to

Mr. Dugan
patrol car.

upon "substantial evidence" of

"every material element of the offense charged," and the State did not establish that a
patrol vehicle is a jailor "place of confinement," in that the plain meaning of the phrase
"place of confinement" does not include a patrol vehicle, the district court erred in
denying Mr. Dugan's motion to dismiss. See LC.R. 5.1 (b).

2.

To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Statute, The Legislative
Intent Was Clearly Not To Include Patrol Vehicles Within The Meaning Of
"Place Of Confinement"

Although the Idaho statute punishing conduct for those who injure a jail in Idaho
has undergone several repeals and re-codifications since the time I.C. § 18-7018 was
originally enacted in 1864, the language is virtually unchanged since 1864. 6

6

In 1864, § 147 provided as follows:
If any person shall, wilfully [sic] and intentionally break down, pull down or
otherwise destroy, injure, in whole or in part, any public jail or other place
of confinement, every person so offending shall, on conviction, be fined in
any sum not exceeding ten thousand dollars, nor less than the value of the
13

of

lengthy

during which
we must look

law

the legislature may have

when it

enacting

area in which they were being
"injuring

legislature

to include a
on

the time

legislation

cars

the law was

did not intend to include a

vehicle within

, At
not possibly

the case

available in 1887, the

included a

7

not

Thus the

meaning of

of

enacted, in 1864,

3,
Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In Favor Of Mr. DU9£!]
If this Court finds that I.C, § 18-'7018 is ambiguous with regard to the "place of
confinement" language, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in favor of
Mr, Dugan. Where the statute is not ambiguous, the appellate court is to give effect to
the plain meanings of the terms in the statute. Verska v, St. A!phonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr.,
151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011).

However, should the Court find that the statute is

ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Dugan's favor.
See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008). "It is well-settled that criminal
statutes are to be construed strictly and in favor of the defendant." State v. McCoy, 128
Idaho 362, 365 (1996). "[AJmbiguity concerning the ambit of crimina! statutes should be

said jail or other place of confinement so destroyed or of such injury as
may have been done thereto by such unlawful act, and be imprisoned in
the territorial prison for any term not exceeding five years, nor less than
one year.
7 The first automobiles built for sale to the public in the United States were made in
1893. http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilHistory_oCthe_automobile
14

in favor of lenity." United
(quoting Rewis v. United

v.

401 U

936
808, 811 (1971)).

(9th
The United

Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an ambiguous statute in
U.S. 1

1991)

v.

(1990).

in determining the
we look not only to the
statutory language, but to
of the statute as a whole
object and policy.
the governing standard is
forth in a criminal
it is
to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the
that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of
boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not
define
inal liability.
Id.

prem

1001

~1 002.

As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the

they give notice to society regarding the bounds

the law, one of the

quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute.
The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of justice and to protect Mr. Dugan's
due process rights, this Court should refrain from ascertaining the possible intent of the
legislature or the policies it might have had in mind in enacting the statute. Accordingly
as is articulated herein, in order to show that Mr. Dugan committed injuring jails within
the meaning of I.e. § 18-7018, the State was required to show that Mr. Dugan damaged
a "place of confinement."

Under this interpretation of the statute, the State offered

insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Dugan of felony injuring jails, and the district court's
order denying his motion to dismiss should be reversed.
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Mr. Dugan respectfully requests that this Court reverse
Motion to Dismiss and
this 8th

his conviction.

of May, 201

Deputy State Appellate Public
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